



Performance of the Voting Organizing Group for the 2019 Election in Sanana District

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ABSTRACT

The research aims to find out and analyze the performance obstacles faced by the Voting Organizing Group (VOG) in the 2019 General Election in Sanana District, Sula Islands Regency. This research uses qualitative research methods with a phenomenological approach. Primary and secondary data were used. The number of informants taken was nine, consisting of two members of the GEC of the Sula Islands Regency, the Chairman of the Election Committee of the 2019 Election Sanana District, the Chairman of the Sanana District Panwas, the Chairman of the Mangon Village VC, and four members of the 2019 Election VOG. The study used performance management theory from Lijan Poltak Sinambela and Sarton Sinambela by taking three indicators, namely training (technical guidance), work motivation, and work discipline. The study's findings indicate that VOG did not perform well in its task of counting votes at polling stations (PS) in the 2019 election. In a number of cases at PS, based on the agreement of the plenary meeting, a recount of votes was carried out at the sub-district level, indicating that a number of PS shifted the vote for both legislative candidates within one party and between political parties. This shows that there is malpractice in the election results at polling stations, the reason being that the duration of vote counting is too long. On the other hand, the administration of election results recorded in the Vote Count Result Certificate (Form Model C1) made many mistakes and was inaccurate. The reason was that there were too many election administration documents at the polling stations, which made VOG tired and unable to concentrate. Inaccurate election results occurred because capacity building through technical guidance was not optimal, there was poor motivation, and work discipline in the form of job distribution among VOG members was not carried out as it should.



INTRODUCTION

General elections are one of the main principles of the democratic political system for the circulation of power, which is carried out periodically as a means of fulfilling the people's sovereignty. "Elections are a mechanism for converting people's votes into seats to occupy political positions in legislative and executive institutions, both at the national and local levels" (Surbakti et al. 2011). The implementation of quality elections is very important to realize good governance. To realize good-quality elections, quality election organizers are needed. "Elections, as a means of democracy and instruments of the people's sovereignty, must fulfill the principles of democratic elections in their implementation, namely: independence, honesty, fairness, legal certainty, orderly, openness, proportionality, professionalism, accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency, as the norm in the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 7 of 2007, as well as technical regulations in the field, namely the General Election Commission Regulation (GECR)."

The implementation of elections in accordance with democratic principles is essentially the implementation of voting and counting at polling stations (PS) and is the culmination of a series of election stages because at this moment every citizen who has the right to vote declares his sovereignty. The field election officers on duty at PS are the Voting Organizing Group (VOG), who are appointed by the Voting Committee (VC) on behalf of the Chairperson of the Regency/City General Election Commission (GEC). In the GEC's hierarchical structure as the election technical organizer, VOG is at the last level. The main task of the VOG is to ensure that all citizens who have the right to vote exercise their constitutional rights, guarantee the security of the voters' votes that have been declared in the voting process, and guarantee the process of converting votes through accurate vote counting and recapitulation. As a result, the VOG is required to carry out its responsibilities in accordance with democratic election principles.

VOG, as frontline bureaucrats in the GEC's hierarchical structure, have the task of carrying out voting, counting, and recapitulation of votes at PS, requiring VOG to comply with work procedures so that there are no overlaps. Thus, VOG officers who comply with the principles and practices of democratic elections and carry out their duties according to electoral law procedures give VOG constitutional legitimacy as well as public legitimacy (Surbakti and Nugroho, 2015). This confirms that as part of the hierarchical structure of election organizers, VOG has a position guaranteed by the constitution so that election results as a result of performance at PS have public legitimacy because election participants and the public have placed their trust in them.

VOG has seven members, including a chairman who is also a member, and six other members, as is well known. The duties of the VOG are distributed to each of the chairmen and members during the voting, counting, and vote recapitulation processes. The detailed distribution and division of tasks for VOG is contained in GECR Technical Regulation 3 of 2019, which aims to create a quality and professional process of voting, counting, and recapitulating votes at PS. The implementation of VOG tasks at PS begins with preparations, including the announcement of polling places and times, sending notifications (form C6) to voters, inventorying logistics, and preparing PS. The next activity is the collection, which starts at 07.00 to 13.00 local time. Then the vote counting began after the voting was declared complete by the head of the VOG. After the vote counting activities are completed, the results are copied in the official report and result certificate according to the type of election. The next task of the VOG is to convey the results of the vote count to election participants as well as to ad hoc institutions above them.

A successful election is very dependent on the quality of the performance of the election organizers who rely on the VOG. Performance is the result of work achieved by an individual or group of individuals in an organization, in accordance with their respective authorities and responsibilities legally, that does not violate applicable rules and is ethical in order to achieve organizational goals (Bukit et al. 2017). "The good performance of election organizers is in accordance with election law, which regulates how organizers carry out election procedures with integrity." VOG, as frontline bureaucrats, have a very strategic role and are the main foundation for election management bodies for quality elections. Therefore, VOG is expected to have a professional, transparent, accountable, affective, and accurate performance in accordance with the principles of democratic elections.



Based on the results of previous studies, there was a gap or deficiency in the implementation of the VOG's duties in the field, which had a negative impact on the expected performance of the VOG relating to election management. This gap creates complexity in the form of obstacles that affect performance and provide opportunities for manipulation of election results that have been declared by voters at the time of voting. In addition to improving abilities and skills, work discipline and motivation are the main keys to realizing good performance from VOG. Capabilities and skills are the determining aspects of VOG's performance, which are very dependent on the extent of VOG's capability in understanding their duties and authorities on voting and counting day. Then, work discipline is related to the compliance and solidity of the VOG in carrying out their duties according to the regulations governing the work mechanism at the PS. Likewise, work motivation has consequences for VOG performance because motivation with encouragement and goals that are not in accordance with the principles of election administration with integrity and democracy makes VOG unprofessional in carrying out their duties, obligations, and authorities when voting and counting votes.

In the implementation of the 2019 elections, there were many problems during the voting and counting of votes, which had consequences for the performance of the VOG. As is known, as many as 527 people died and 11,239 fell ill, and it is suspected that the cause was the VOG's workload being too heavy. In addition, there were many errors in the recapitulation of vote counting (Ardipandanto, 2019). This sparked many arguments regarding the 2019 election in relation to the performance of the VOG as expressed by electoral experts, analysts, and practitioners. Titi Anggraini mentioned two things, namely the five-box election and the exhausting administration of the election from before voting to vote counting and recapitulation (DW, April 30). "Ilham Syahputra saw it in the simultaneous election system, which was complicated enough to cause extreme fatigue for the VOG (Kompas, April 23, 2019)." According to Syamsudin Haris (Aziz et al. 2020), the source of the problem behind the inhumane burden of VOG officers lies in the five-box simultaneous elections, and the implementation of an open proportional system with a majority vote mechanism for the 16 political parties participating in the election is strongly suspected of being a crucial issue, which is a source of tragedy for VOG's humanity. Then, according to Ramadhanil et al. (2020), the main problem is in the electoral system and the management of election administration. The electoral system is related to the type of simultaneous election of five ballots and election management issues related to the recruitment of ad hoc officers and technical guidance, as well as the complexity of election administration.

One of the results of observational research on voting day, April 17, 2019, which was conducted in ten different provinces, namely North Sumatra, Riau, Riau Islands, Lampung, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta Special Region, East Java, and South Sulawesi, found that VOG works 24 hours non-stop, in some cases even more than that, causing them to fall ill from exhaustion and a number of others to die. The design of the five types of ballots confused voters. The large number of candidates nominated by 16 political parties has forced voters to be careful when viewing, searching for, and voting for their chosen candidate, which voters consider too complicated. Many voters are confused by the design of the ballot. Also discovered were issues with voter lists, the rise of money politics, and a lack of socialization regarding the five types of ballots (Alhamdi ed. 2020). "Apart from that, there were also errors in the vote counting process as outlined in C1.Plano, as well as official reports and certificates of vote counting results at almost all polling stations (PS)." The findings of the observational research above seem to be evenly distributed throughout Indonesia, with almost the same cases, including the Sula Islands Regency. Geographically, Sula Islands Regency is one of the regencies in North Maluku Province. The Sula Archipelago Regency consists of two islands, namely Mangoli Island, which consists of North East Mangoli District, East Mangoli District, Central Mengoli District, South Mangoli District, West Mangoli District, and North Mangoli District. Then Sulabesi Island, which consists of Sanana District, Central Sulabesi District, East Sulabesi District, South Sulabesi District, West Sulabesi District, and North Sanana District.

Based on the observations and experiences of researchers during the 2019 elections in Sanana District, Sula Islands Regency, the phenomenon of the complexity of VOG carrying out tasks on voting day, counting, and recapitulating votes is also almost exactly the same. This can be seen in a number of aspects such as regulations, budgets, and implementation mechanisms that affect VOG's performance. On the regulatory aspect, "VOG was



given a very limited opportunity and time, incomparable to the large volume of work in carrying out the process of voting and counting votes in PS." This became psychological pressure to spur VOGs to quickly complete their tasks and obligations, causing VOGs to rush in completing tasks, and in the end, a number of VOGs fell ill and fainted, so they were rushed to the hospital. It also causes an error in filling out the form because the work is done in a limited amount of time. On the budget side, ahead of voting day, VOGs in a number of villages resigned because the VOG honorarium was too small. This phenomenon came to the fore during the technical guidance for voting and counting, when a number of VOG officers protested because the fee was too small and not commensurate with VOG's work. Also, the budget for the establishment of PS is minimal; there is no budget for the distribution of notifications to voters (Form C6), and food and drink money are budgeted for only one day, even though the VOG works for three days, doubling the amount of C3 (the Voters Companion Form) in each PS.

This happened because most of the elderly voters used their right to vote with a companion. Budget problems are not only at the VOG but also at the sub-district level. ECD had difficulty duplicating the DAA and DA1 documents because they did not have a printed budget and photocopies of documents, which of course had to be distributed to each presidential election candidate pair, political party witness, individual candidate, sub-district Panwas, district GEC, and archives for ECD. In addition, there are problems related to the capabilities needed to support VOG performance. The number of VOG members participating in technical guidance is limited because the allocation of the technical guidance budget is prioritized only for two VOG officers, resulting in a low level of understanding among other VOGs who do not participate in technical guidance. Moreover, it was exacerbated by the slow distribution of the guidebooks, which VOG received one day before voting day.

In addition, almost all VOGs were constrained during vote counting because there were so many C1-Plano Model Forms and there was no board to attach C1-Plano to during vote counting. In many cases, VOG filled out the minutes and certificates of vote counting results beyond the allotted time due to the large number of copies of the forms that had to be filled out for witnesses from 16 political parties, witnesses for presidential candidates, each witness for the Regional Representatives Council (RRC), PS supervisors, Election Committee District (ECD), GEC, and VOG archives. "Error filling out the Model C form (VCR certificate) in all PSs due to a miscalculation between voting rights users, ballots used, and valid and invalid ballots, as well as a misunderstanding in distinguishing damaged ballots and invalid ballots." A number of VOG errors in filling out the Mode C1 form also indicated manipulation of the vote counting process.

Apart from the chaos in the implementation of voting and counting as described, there are also other phenomena related to electoral fraud at the PS level that were allegedly committed by VOG elements. Because of the complexities of the electoral process in counting votes, there were opportunities for violations and VOG officers lacked integrity." Among the election categories with integrity is when the process of voting and counting of votes is carried out accurately, free of errors and manipulation, so that the election results determined and announced by the GEC are the same as the votes cast by the voters" (Surbakti and Nugoroho, 2015). "It is critical to realize the integrity of voting and counting of votes in particular, as well as the integrity of elections in general, because it will ensure the legitimacy and acceptance of the election process and results." Thus, the role of the VOG is the key to how election results with integrity and democracy can be ensured by ensuring and guaranteeing the constitutional rights of citizens that have been declared in the voting process so that their security can be guaranteed at the PS level during vote counting. However, the procedure for counting votes in the 2019 election still opens up great opportunities for efforts to manipulate election results at the PS level. In addition to the heavy workload due to the long and tiring duration of vote counting, there are also indications of the practice of manipulating election results at the PS level during vote counting.

According to the researcher's own experience, allegations of manipulation surfaced in the recapitulation plenary meeting at the Sanana District level, Sula Islands Regency. A number of witnesses for legislative candidates (Caleg) protested against the massive typographical errors in the Model C1 Form, and there were even differences between the C1 copies held by each witness, thus demanding that the ballot boxes be opened for a recount. After the sharing was carried out, according to the agreement reached in the plenary meeting of the Supervisory Committee for Sanana District, they recommended a recount of the votes. The Chairperson of



the ECD followed up on the recommendations of the District Panwaslu, which then carried out a recount of the votes.

Apart from the chaos in the implementation of voting and counting as described, there are also other phenomena related to electoral fraud at the PS level that were allegedly committed by VOG elements. There were opportunities for violations and fraud due to the complexities of the electoral process in counting votes. Although this phenomenon was not followed up to the stage of finding criminal election violations and was not documented, this case is an example of manipulation of election results during vote counting that needs to be explored more deeply because it relates to the integrity and professionalism of VOG's performance in carrying out their duties at PS. The indication of manipulation of the election results is an iceberg phenomenon, which of course still has many other unresolved issues related to VOG's performance in the 2019 elections in Sanana District. Based on the description above, this study seeks to dig deeper into the obstacles to VOG performance in the 2019 General Elections in Sanana District, Sula Islands Regency, so as to unravel more issues that are still hidden and have not been disclosed during the process of voting, counting, and recapitulation of votes in PS.

METHOD

This study uses a qualitative design with a phenomenological research approach. Phenomenological research (phenomenological research) is a qualitative research approach that describes explanations from informants about their life experiences in experiencing a phenomenon. "The data collected from the informants was then developed into a combined description of the essence of the experience for all informants, in terms of the description containing what they experienced and how they experienced it" (Creswell, 2015). This kind of research focuses on describing the general meaning of a social phenomenon and what is common to informants when they experience this phenomenon. "For this reason, identification of the social phenomena experienced by informants as objects of experience, in this case the experiences of a number of informants from the Voting Organizing Group (VOG) in the implementation of the 2019 Election, regarding the extent to which their performance

The following method of data collection was carried out: First, literature study, namely data collection, was carried out by reading references to various sources, such as books and articles related to the research focus. Second, interviews were conducted face-to-face by asking the informant directly about the data or information to be obtained. Third, the documentation method, namely the collection of public documents in the form of office reports and documents in digital form on the website. All data were analyzed using the Miles and Huberman model in 3 stages, namely: data reduction, data display, data verification, and drawing conclusions (Sugiyono, 2021).

Data reduction is a step carried out by researchers by summarizing, sorting out the main things, focusing on certain themes and patterns, and making categorizations that are guided by theory and the goals to be achieved, namely findings. After the data has been reduced, the data is presented in the form of brief descriptions, charts, or tables, and relationships between categories are described in narrative form (Sugiyono, 2021). Next is drawing conclusions and verifying them, aimed at seeing the meaning of the data that has been collected by looking for a relationship, similarities, and differences, then drawing a conclusion from the problems found. The research was conducted in November 2022. Informants who became informants in the research were selected based on a purposive sampling strategy (Creswell, 2015), in which the researchers themselves place informants based on certain criteria that are considered representative to obtain the information needed in the research. This study included nine informants, who were as follows:

1. Member of the GEC of the Sula Islands Regency.
2. Member of ECD Sanana 2019 election.
3. Member of the Supervisory Committee for the 2019 Sanana District Election.
4. Mangon Village VC member.
5. VOG members in a number of villages in Sanana District.



RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Voting is the culmination and at the same time the core of the electoral process because, at this stage, the political sovereignty of every citizen is channeled to parties and candidates who will fill public positions in democratic political institutions both at the national and local levels. The Voting Organizing Group (VOG) is spearheading the implementation of voting and counting votes at the polling places (PS). VOG is required to carry out the process of voting and counting votes while still prioritizing the principles of democratic elections, namely integrity, professionalism, transparency, effectiveness, and accuracy. However, in practice, a number of problems arose in PS that had not been thought of before in the formulation and technical implementation norms in the field. The findings from observations by Ridho Alhamdi et al. (2021) on voting day, April 17, 2019 prove that all PS experience the same problems throughout Indonesia, including in the Sula Islands Regency. In many cases, the vote counting process was carried out until the morning of the second day, and the administration of election results was complicated due to the large number of forms or certificates of vote counting results (VCR) in PS, causing the VOG to be negligent, tired, and unable to concentrate on completing tasks. On the other hand, the norms in the Election Law also provide a limited time for VOG to complete its work, which is only one day, although this was later annulled by the Constitutional Court.

In Law Number 7/2017, Article 390, paragraphs (2), (3), and (5), requires VOG to submit certificates of vote counting results to witnesses participating in the election, including PS, VC, and ECD supervisors, and to have handed over the sealed ballot box to the VC the same day. The fact is that in the 2019 elections, this article was violated. From a managerial and technical point of view, GEC has not had time to measure the level of difficulty of the workload faced by VOG; this can be seen in the large number of allotment forms. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court decision number 20/PUU-XVII/2019 even gave VOG an additional 12 hours non-stop to complete the vote count. Inconsistent legal frameworks coupled with unmeasured technical management meant that VOG faced a number of major problems. This can be seen in the many appropriation forms that VOG must complete in PS.

Referring to the results of the study, VOG completed the vote counting starting at 14.00 local time, generally finishing early on the second day in the time range around 23.00 to 05.00 in the morning local time. The duration of time for counting votes like this provides an opportunity for election malpractice to occur during the process of counting and administering election results in Form Model C1 in PS. As stated in the research results, VOG manipulated votes massively in a number of PSs, as seen in the vote recount during the plenary meeting at the sub-district level. VOG members in all villages in Sanana District shifted votes not only between candidates in one party but also shifted votes between political parties. This indication may be evidence that the cause of writing errors is not only human error, but that there is a data game causing data discrepancies in Form Model C1.

Table. Comparison of Data Model C1 and DAA Model PS 15 Mangon Village

| Description | PPWP | | DPR | | DPD | | Provincial DPRD | | DPRD Regency/City | |
|--|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------------|-----|-------------------|-----|
| | C1 | DAA | C1 | DAA | C1 | DAA | C1 | DAA | C1 | DAA |
| Voter Data and Voting Rights Users | | | | | | | | | | |
| Voter Data | 167 | 167 | 167 | 167 | 167 | 167 | 167 | 167 | 167 | 167 |
| Suffrage Users | 125 | 117 | 125 | 115 | 125 | 115 | 125 | 115 | 125 | 115 |
| Ballot Use Data | | | | | | | | | | |
| The number of letters received includes reserves | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 | 162 |



| | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Sura was returned because it was damaged | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| Suras are not used | 45 | 45 | 47 | 47 | 45 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 | 47 |
| ballot used | 116 | 117 | 112 | 115 | 116 | 115 | 112 | 115 | 112 | 115 |
| Legal and Invalid Voice Data | | | | | | | | | | |
| Legitimate vote | 116 | 116 | 106 | 108 | 112 | 106 | 113 | 112 | 111 | 111 |
| Invalid Votes | 1 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 3 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
| Number of Valid and Invalid Votes | 117 | 117 | 113 | 115 | 115 | 115 | 115 | 115 | 111 | 115 |

Source: GEC of Sula Archipelago Regency, Processed

According to Mewoh et al. (2015), technically, the manipulation of election results is carried out by individual election participants through complex innovations, namely tricking gaps in the electoral process that can be manipulated, one of which is because the election organizers lack integrity. Gaffar (2015) mentions vote manipulation in PS in the case that VOG members have been bought by unscrupulous legislative candidates, which has led to a high number of invalid ballots. When counting votes, a fingernail is used to punch a hole. Because there are two punch marks on the ballot, it becomes invalid. This benefits one party and harms the other.

In addition to the election malpractice mode used by Mewoh and Gaffar, according to the researcher, there are other modes that are wide open because the duration of the vote count is too long. This mode, namely VOG calling the serial numbers of candidates who were not chosen by voters during vote counting, happened when the vote counting process was only attended by a number of VOG, witnesses, and exhausted PS supervisors where the vote counting was carried out late into the night. It could also happen during vote counting when the VOG chairperson mentions one of the candidate's serial numbers but the VOG who did the counting writes it down on the serial number or that of another party. In addition, vote manipulation can also occur due to errors and inaccurate counting results on voter data, ballot data received, including backups, ballot data used, ballot data damaged, ballot data invalid, and ballot data valid. So the assumption that vote manipulation could have occurred naturally was due to inaccurate counting results due to negligence and fatigue.

Too long a vote counting time can create opportunities for fraud in the form of inflation and shifting of voter votes at the PS level by VOG elements. This could have happened because the vote count was carried out late at night and then continued to fill in the minutes and VCR certificates until the early hours of the second day. According to the researcher's own observations during the vote counting at the PS in the 2019 elections in Sanana District, a number of PS even carried out the vote count without being witnessed by witnesses or by PS supervisors. This fact occurred because many had left the PS for a short break due to fatigue, so that the vote counting process was only carried out by a small number of VOGs and witnessed by a small number of people around the PS. In such circumstances, of course, there are many modes of election malpractice that can be carried out.

The results of the research show that vote counting in the PS in the 2019 election is very susceptible to manipulation of vote results. The originality of voters who channel their votes and constitutional rights to election participants can be mocked as being transferred at will to certain parties or candidates by election organizers, degrading the quality of elections and creating public distrust of organizers and institutions that organize elections in the next election. Thus, improving the integrity and quality of election organizers and technical management is a major concern for the future. In addition to the long duration of time for counting votes, which creates space for election malpractice, the recording of election results administration documents can also provide an opportunity for the shifting of voter votes between candidates within one party and between



political parties. This kind of suspicion could have occurred because filling in the minutes and Vote Count Result Certificate (VCR) or Model C1 Form was carried out at night until early in the morning on the second day. On the other hand, many VOGs were exhausted, and in the end, they trusted a number of VOGs to complete the task. Work done in a state of fatigue will certainly not produce quality output. In such a context, VOG's work cannot be expected to produce a good and correct performance.

The 2019 election is the first to combine five types of elections at once, so that the election administration is in the form of recapitulations of vote counting results consisting of five types. There are 19 (nineteen) types of forms in PS, of which 6 (six) types of forms must be written, as many as the number of witnesses participating in the election, and for ECD, PS Supervisors, and Regency/Municipal GEC. This large number of forms causes many form-filling errors. Administrative complexity is one of the problems that causes VOG's poor performance. Filling out the form in the form of many copies of the designation, which is the task of VOG, certainly feels very heavy and irrational. Filling out a copy of the form, if calculated correctly, can reach 500 pages with a thickness of about 35 cm. Even before it was written down in a copy, VOG was absurdly confused about completing the calculations because in many cases there were discrepancies between the data of voters, users of the right to vote, the vote tally for each candidate, used ballots, and unused ballots. There are also discrepancies in the number of ballots used in each of the five types of elections.

This fact is a problem for VOG because the official report, which contains data on the number of voters, voting rights users, the use of ballot papers, and the candidate's vote acquisition, must be in accordance with the five types of elections, which is a psychological burden in itself. VOG's work had started two days earlier in the form of preparing PSs, distributing notification forms to each voter, and taking an inventory of the forms that were outside the ballot boxes. Submission of the notification form to voters requires physical strength because it is done by visiting each voter's house. Even on the day of the election, preparations had started two hours earlier by preparing several forms outside the ballot box. Work procedures and a heavy burden of responsibility for the implementation of voting and vote counting have not been taken into account in technical regulations or election management. At first glance, the GEC regulations, which are technical regulations in the field, seem monotonous and do not consider VOG's position in carrying out this formidable task. Even GEC Regulation 3/2019 is out of reach for the majority of the VOG because it is so thick at 565 pages.

The quality aspect of VOG's resources also cannot be expected to be professional in carrying out the vote count. Because of a lack of funds, only two of the seven VOG Members attended technical guidance (TG). The TG conducted by GRC district was mostly aimed at ECD and VC, namely three times, while for VOG it was only done once. Even the TG for VOG was not carried out optimally. According to the research findings, technical guidance was provided prior to voting day and in a rush, so the delivery of materials and simulations of filling out forms were perceived to be very limited in order to increase VOG's ability and understanding of different types of forms and other tasks in PS. In fact, if we look at the structure of the types of forms in PS, technical guidance that is carried out only once in terms of quality will not result in a VOG performing well. Generally, the implementation of technical guidance is only carried out once, with the material introducing various forms, forms of valid and invalid votes, how to treat permanent voter list voters, additional voters, special voters, such as voters who use identity cards, and transferring voters to five types of ballots, as well as procedures for filling out the Model C1 Form. It is with great hope that VOGs who are present at the technical guidance can transfer their knowledge to VOG friends who are not present.

In addition to training or technical guidance that was not optimal for VOG, referring to research results, VOG did not have specific motivations to support the implementation of the task of voting and counting votes in PS. Motivation as a driving force that creates enthusiasm for carrying out a given task is apparently only understood as an incentive, seeking experience, and taking the time to contribute and self-actualize because you don't have a job. The lack of motivation provided by ad hoc institutions at higher levels exacerbates this condition. In fact, paying attention to efforts to increase enthusiasm for carrying out a task for VOG is very important because dealing with tough and tiring work certainly depends heavily on the motivation of each individual and group to achieve organizational goals that have been set. Poor work motivation will give birth to bad performance as well.



With regard to work discipline, VOG has implemented the norms and provisions governing the distribution of work when carrying out voting and vote counting tasks. It's just that when filling out the Minutes and Certificate of Vote Count Results (Form Model C1), it is generally entrusted to a number of VOGs to avoid filling out the wrong forms. As is commonly understood, the Election Law and technical regulations regarding voting and vote counting have detailed the division of VOG tasks so that each takes on a role according to their responsibilities. This was done to avoid concentrating work in just a few VOGs. However, in its implementation, it faced a number of obstacles, especially in the VOG, which did not take part in training or technical guidance, and which, in the implementation of technical guidance by the Regency GEC, only presented two VOG members. This fact creates a dilemma: on the one hand, VOG has implemented the norm of division of labor, but on the other hand, VOG members who do not follow technical guidance may not have the capability and understanding of their duties.

In such a context, it is possible that the many writing and summarization errors that appear on the Model C1 Form are an indication that the division of labor has indeed been carried out according to the norms and regulations, but the ability and understanding of the VOG, who did not follow technical guidance, became a problem. It could be that, in many cases, this division of labor is not carried out properly. So it can be said that the distribution of work that has been regulated in the GEGR and the VOG guidebook is not implemented properly. This means that VOG's work only relies on a few people, making them very burdened by doing all the other aspects of VOG's work because only they understand this aspect of work.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the results of the research and discussion that have been described, the results of this study can be described as follows: VOG's performance in carrying out the task of counting and recapitulating votes was poor. As with the findings of the research, there is voter manipulation in almost all PSs with the mode of shifting votes between candidates in one party or between political parties, which is done when counting votes or when recording the administration of election results in Form Model C1. This kind of violation can occur because the duration of vote counting is too long in PS. Too many types of allotment forms made the administration of election results complicated, which made VOG negligent and exhausted so that the recording of vote counting results in the VCR Certificate made many mistakes. On the other hand, the training and technical guidance conducted by the Regency GEC were not optimal and effective due to limited budgets. The TG conducted on VOG was not maximized because it was carried out only once by inviting only two VOG members for a very limited time. VOG members' work motivations are varied and non-specific. In general, their motivation is more inclined toward the incentives they want to get in the form of honoraria or mere self-actualization efforts. Then, VOG has carried out its work according to the norms governing the division of labor, and work has been distributed to each VOG Member. However, because only two VOG Members participate in technical training or guidance, they are still constrained by their limited ability and understanding of their respective main tasks. The suggestions that the researchers put forward in this study refer to the research results, namely as follows:

1. Vote counting and recording of the Vote Counting Result Certificate (VCR) should not be carried out at night because it opens up opportunities for election malpractice. Vote counting and recording of VCR certificates can be carried out the next day, so that the duration of vote counting is extended.
2. There should be a simplification of the administration of vote counting and recapitulation results in PS.
3. Optimizing VOG performance through training and technical guidance at least twice to present VOG in rotation or in stages by District GEC, ECD, and VC; providing motivation that leads to the enthusiasm to complete tasks with integrity by election organizers at every level; and coordinating the distribution of work with training and technical guidance for all VOGs.



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