



The Dynamic of Livelihood Recovery Program in Post Disaster Area: Challenges and Obstacles

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ABSTRACT

Disasters cause most communities to lose their livelihoods and often place them in a more vulnerable condition. The government together with Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) are tackling these impacts through various Livelihood Recovery programs. However, little is known about how the program is run. This study aims to further explore how the dynamics of livelihood recovery programs in post-disaster areas. The method used is Mixed Methods where surveys, interviews and FGDs are conducted in data collection. This study found that the Cash Voucher Assistance (CVA) Program has been able to provide a source of livelihood for the beneficiaries, which is indicated by the fact that most of the businesses are still running. Switching business types and adding product types are beneficiary strategies to maintain their business. However, the weakness in building coordination with several government parties has led to the disintegration of the program which has an impact on further assistance. In addition, the program period, the quantity of beneficiaries and the human resources capacity of the program implementers have an impact on the quality of assistance provided.



INTRODUCTION

The Palu City, Donggala Regency, Sigi, and Parigi Moutong (PADAGIMO) residents were harmed by the 2018 Earthquake Disaster, which was followed by Liquefaction and Tsunami. According to a National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) report, the total loss from the disaster reached 13.83 trillion¹. The losses spread to a variety of sectors, including settlements, infrastructure, the economy, and social services. The government then seeks to mitigate these effects through the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction program, one of which is the construction of Permanent Shelters. As of September 2021, 3,272 Permanent Residential Units (out of a total of 11,788 units) had been successfully constructed for disaster victims². However, the fact that many victims are still living in Temporary Shelters after three years has raised concerns. The dynamics of land release and data overlapping on permanent housing assistance recipients are suspected to be the primary causes of relocation delays.

The spread of COVID-19 in early 2020 exacerbated the effects of this disaster. As of September 2021, there were 4.2 million cases of this virus in Indonesia, with 141,467 deaths. This record also places Indonesia among the countries with the highest rate of COVID-19 spread in the world³. During the same time period, there were 46341 cases in Central Sulawesi Province, with 1,561 deaths⁴. As a precautionary measure, the government has implemented several policies, including Community Activity Restrictions (CAR), in which work activities are transferred to home (work from home), Distance Learning (DL), and regional quarantine.

Recently, CAR has had a paradoxical impact in its effort to reduce the spread of COVID-19. On the one hand, this policy is said to have reduced the number of COVID-19 cases⁵ but at the other hand, it actually complicates the community's economic conditions, particularly for survivors. As a result, Indonesia entered a recession, with economic growth contracting by 5.3 percent on average. This condition was also followed by a significant increase in Indonesia's open unemployment rate (Central Bureau of Statistics). In a crisis situation like this, good disaster management is required and capable of minimizing community harm. An approach capable of involving victim participation (Bottom-up approach), rather than a command system (Top-down approach), which has proven to be ineffective (Imperiale & Vanclay, 2020).

As is the case with the reconstruction of permanent housing, which is deemed ineffective if only houses are built while ignoring the community's socioeconomic and cultural life (Dias et al., 2016), whereas, in a disaster situation, the community is most vulnerable to the social impact (Zeng et al., 2021). Olehnya Clinton (2006) menyebutkan bahwa kunci kesuksesan untuk mengetahui keberhasilan program pemulihan adalah apakah program tersebut dapat mengurangi kerentanan bagi korban jika menghadapi bencana di masa mendatang atau justru sebaliknya.

In the context of the disaster at PADAGIMO, the government, in collaboration with various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), is attempting to mitigate the disaster's impact through various post-disaster recovery programs. Stimulant Assistance programs, for example, are still in place to help communities rebuild their livelihoods. The program's targets range from earthquake victims to business actors affected by both the earthquake and the COVID-19 disasters.

Livelihood Recovery is one of the most widely used programs. "The capabilities, assets, and activities required for a means of living" can be defined as "livelihood" (Chambers & Conway, 1992). That is, this program aims to provide a person or group with the capabilities and abilities needed to live life in a crisis situation. This ability is undoubtedly unique to each individual, depending on their circumstances. (Zeng et al., 2021) discovered in their study that borrowing to use savings is a common adaptation strategy.

¹ <https://bnpb.go.id/berita/kerugian-dan-kerusakan-dampak-bencana-di-sulawesi-tengah-mencapai-1382-trilyun-rupiah>

² Laporan Tim Monitoring Penyediaan Hunian Tetap – SKP-HAM Sulteng

³ <https://covid19.go.id/p/berita/analisis-data-covid-19-indonesia-update-26-september-2021>

⁴ <https://dinkes.sultengprov.go.id/update-30-september-2021/>

⁵ <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20210820145000-20-683056/kemenkes-klaim-penurunan-covid-ri-dampak-ppkm-dan-vaksinasi>



Meanwhile, farmers use crop variety adjustment, water and fertilizer management, and agricultural equipment support as strategies to reduce livelihood risks (Kuang et al., 2020). For fishermen, increasing the length of time spent fishing, changing target species, and changing fishing gear are all methods of surviving the effects of climate change (Musinguzi et al., 2016). Research (Joakim & Wismer, 2015) emphasizes the importance of capital support, capacity building, and market network expansion for beneficiaries in order to strengthen this strategy.

The survivors in this study accepted Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA) as a means of subsistence. NGOs provide survivors with business capital and training on business capacity building for a ten-month period. Survivors who are still living in Temporary Shelters are the primary beneficiaries. However, little is known about the dynamics of the Livelihood Recovery Program, including the coping strategies used by survivors to keep their businesses running. The purpose of this study is to delve deeper into these two topics, specifically how the dynamics of the implementation of livelihood recovery programs include challenges and obstacles to coping strategies for survivors in post-disaster areas. Palu City and Sigi Regency were chosen as the locations. The two areas were the hardest hit by the disaster and are receiving various types of livelihood recovery programs.

METHOD

The method used in this study is a mixed method (mix method) of qualitative and quantitative data collection. In order to collect qualitative data, researchers must first determine the type of Livelihood Recovery program that the NGO has completed. Following that, the researcher conducted the preliminary identification of all parties involved in the program. Following that, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with survivors, program implementers, and stakeholders. In the meantime, a survey of household heads was carried out to collect quantitative data, with a total sample of 174 households randomly selected at eight Temporary Residential Points in Palu City and Sigi Regency. In addition, researchers conduct document studies in order to obtain more accurate and measurable data.

Table 1. Method of collecting data

Data Collection Tool	Key Informant Interview (KII)	Focus Group Discussion (FGD)	Survey
Respondent Description	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) 3 Lurah 2) 2 Heads of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 3) 1 Program Manager 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) 4 Types of Business consisting of 36 Survivors 2) 10 Program Implementer staff 	174 Survivor Samples consisted of Palu 157 and Sigi 17
Information	Informants were determined using purposive sampling with the consideration that the informants interacted directly with the program.	Participants were selected based on the representation of the type of business from each intervention area.	The sample was determined based on the systematic random sampling method from a total of 305 survivors who



			received the program.
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Table 2. Survey Respondent Background

County/City	Man	Woman	Total
Palu	5	152	157
Sigi	1	16	17
Total	6	168	174

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Between Basic Needs and Business Sustainability

One of the most important indicators for livelihood restoration efforts is business sustainability. According to the findings of this study, the majority of the businesses that received assistance and assistance were still in operation (see Figure 1.)




Figure 1.

According to this diagram, 97 percent are still in operation, while only 2 percent have closed their doors. The main reason the business is still operating is because of the high purchasing power, which allows profits to be reinvested in the business. However, the main reason for the business's demise is that the capital is being used for family needs. The program implementer confirms this data as well.

"Businesses that have closed down do so not only due to a lack of ability to run a business, but also due to economic demands. Finally, not all of the capital provided is used for business."

The urgency of these basic needs is a challenge in and of itself, putting survivors in a difficult position. On the one hand, they must use capital assistance in accordance with the program's initial objectives, but they are also held hostage by unfavorable economic conditions. Figure 2 shows that at least 22 percent (39 out of 174) of respondents have spent on capital assistance beyond the initial planning.




Figure 2.

These needs include daily family expenses, medical expenses, and children's education costs, while others claim they are used to buy clothes to pay off debts. This reality appears to demonstrate how, in general, the survivors are in an emergency situation. The number of economic dependents, which is sometimes not proportional to the business's results. Many survivors in disaster areas are in the same situation as the proverb "the stake is bigger than the pillar." Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the situation, forcing many businesses to shut down.

This was emphasized in the survivors' focus group discussion, which stated, "*because there are survivors who also use business capital to buy family needs such as rice, buy credit, and even pay installments.*" This type of condition is not a new occurrence. In many cases, disaster survivors must be able to determine their own survival strategy in a crisis situation. The level of vulnerability they will experience in that situation is determined by their resilience ability. According to the findings of this study, switching business types and adding product types were survivors' strategies for staying in business. According to the percentage in diagram 1. above, as many as 5 percent of survivors choose to change their type of business to respond to market conditions. "*I sell ampang, but I also sell wet cakes because I make money every day.*" As a result, it can meet the needs of the family" FGD survivors. Furthermore, the capital assistance provided is being used to expand the types of products sold.

The survivors' ability to run a business and their ease of access to capital are also factors that contribute to business sustainability. In this case, it was discovered that the survivors' capital was very limited, and that some of it had even been used to meet basic needs. Survivors, on the other hand, see a variety of options for applying for a capital loan. Procedures and conditions, for example, that are deemed too complicated to the point of fear of incurring debt. Religious beliefs about debt prohibition influence survivors' decisions to seek capital assistance through bank loans.

Survivors now have a greater ability to run businesses. This training is designed to help each survivor run their business in a sustainable way. The diagram below depicts the level of participation of survivors in each training agenda.




Figure 3.

According to the diagram above, the most popular types of training are financial records, business planning, and digital marketing. These trainings are beneficial to the survivors' survival. *"Financial literacy training has been extremely beneficial to us. So, better understand how to manage a business's finances, beginning with income and ending with profits. Furthermore, the digital marketing training is excellent; currently, many of my customers order through Facebook and Instagram"* (FGD survivors).

This training, however, must emphasize an approach that takes into account more vulnerable groups, such as the elderly. This is due to the fact that their health conditions and educational background make it difficult for them to retain the information presented, particularly if the training methods used are not responsive enough to these conditions.

Mis-Coordination to The Dilemma of Determining Criteria

Stakeholder participation is critical to the program's success. The government parties referred to here are village heads and the Office of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSME). Both are government agencies with close ties to the survivors. The Village Head has authority over every citizen, and the MSME Service, as the institution in charge of business in the community, has authority over the MSME Service. The government is being asked to be a part of a series of programs that will be implemented in this Livelihood Recovery program, from the assessment stage of potential beneficiaries to program monitoring. The goal is for the government to be fully informed about the program's progress.

However, the coordination did not go as planned. A communication line that is quite intense during the project has not been established between the Program Implementor, the Village Head Government, and the MSME Service. The lurah and MSME claimed to be still heavily involved in various stages of the activity. As a result, they have no idea how far the program has progressed.

"We were only involved in the early stages, only knowing that there was an assistance program for Huntara residents, but we hope that reports on the progress of program implementation will come to us so that we can help facilitate them with the relevant agencies in the future" (KII-Lurah).

"Because we have a free program for the management of Home Industry Products, Business Identification Numbers, and Halal certificates, as well as a Technical Implementation Unit, we hope to be involved in every monitoring process so that we know which ones are having problems and



which ones we need to help improve their business. Survivor training and technical assistance" (KII-MSME).

This is also confirmed by the Program Implementer in cases where coordination is lacking. One reason is that the program has a short duration, so they must move quickly.

"We admit that the coordination between the MSME service and the Lurah was not well developed due to time constraints. Actually, we invited the government as well, but they did not send representatives or attend the agenda" (FGD-IP).

This lack of participation has an impact on the survivors' business's ability to continue to assist them. The government stated that they were unaware of the businesses that had received assistance or of the conditions that would exist after the program was completed. Furthermore, the majority of the businesses that are funded do not meet the criteria that MSME can help with further. The kelurahan party also questioned the issue of the kelurahan's empowerment budget, which was so small that it could not guarantee that it could follow up on this livelihood restoration program. As a result, business continuity is dependent on each survivor's abilities.

The determination of the criteria for recipients of assistance is also fraught with difficulty. This is due to the program's implementer stating that the determination of CVA participants went through two valid mechanisms, namely assessment and verification, in which all parties were also involved. From the initial registration, selection, and data validation, a selection committee comprised of representatives from the village government, Program Implementors, Temporary Shelter Coordinators, and Survivors Representatives was involved. *"We identify, verify, and validate together so that the survivor's data is accurate"* (KII – Village Head). Furthermore, the data collection process, which is carried out door-to-door, is thought to be capable of reaching the entire community who are in temporary shelter.

However, some parties believe that this preliminary process still has flaws. One of them is information about the standard eligibility criteria for prospective beneficiaries, which is not distributed evenly. Only those with access to the program's information consume it. As a result, misinformation is unavoidable in society, which leads to conflict. Protests against beneficiaries who are not residents of temporary shelters highlight this conflict.

The program's implementer also confirmed that several businesses could not be verified because their locations were too far away. Due to a lack of time and human resources, this unexpected event occurred. *"In fact, we set the criteria for the minimum distance from the shelter location at the start, so that verification and monitoring would be easier"* (FGD IP).

This criterion was also questioned by the MSME Agency. They explained that the program was intended from the start to target small and medium-sized businesses affected by the disaster. However, in determining the business criteria, the Program Implementor is deemed to have failed to consider the government's priorities. Kiosk businesses, for example, were not included in the government's priority MSME criteria, despite being one of the types of businesses that received the most assistance. This misalignment will almost certainly have an impact on the program's future follow-up efforts. Obviously, the MSME Agency cannot assist businesses in this category. As a result, many activities that could have been carried out in collaboration with MSME could not be carried out. *"The program implementer should share information with us about the types of businesses that will be intervened in, so that it is consistent with the program for empowering business actors in the MSME service. We can't help but intervene if it's like this"* (KII-MSME).

According to the Program Implementor, the agency lacked a clear database. Attempts were made to synchronize data, but overlapping data and complicated and time-consuming procedures led them to decide to collect data independently.



Distribution Mechanism

Aside from the criteria issue, the choice of the Point of Sales (POS) Office as a medium for distributing aid was met with approval. This mechanism is thought to have been well managed because it took the comfort of the survivors into account during the aid disbursement process. The mechanism begins with registration and progresses through file checking, directing the use of funds, and issuing coupons/withdrawal slips. People who are vulnerable, such as pregnant women and the elderly, are given special consideration during this process. Furthermore, the waiting time for each transaction is relatively short, lasting only 15-20 minutes. The presence of a "health promotion" assistant who directs the process is also thought to provide survivors with a sense of comfort and security. They prefer to use POS over other mechanisms such as banks. "We feel very at ease because the line is only 15-20 minutes long." *They are also accompanied, so they are safe*" (FGD – survivors).

The anticipation of the accumulation of survivors in one disbursement time should be noted from this process. Although each participant has been divided according to the disbursement schedule, many still disregard it in practice. As a result, disbursement in groups led by a single group leader is thought to be more effective and will be implemented in the future. "In the future, it is preferable to create a guided group schedule so that no one arrives haphazardly" (FGD-IP).

Weaknesses of Monitoring Process

Various parties provided feedback during the monitoring stage. The survivors believed that the Program Implementor's monitoring process was adequate for controlling and supervising their business activities. Weekly meetings to check proof of purchase and bookkeeping are thought to improve business accountability. However, scheduled monitoring creates opportunities for survivors to tamper with reports. For example, reporting products spent that do not correspond to the actual situation. "He took an old item and simply reported it to the supervisor. Many people are like that" (Survivor FGD).

Furthermore, the survivors emphasized the consistency of the conditions for aid disbursement. They believed that the Program Implementor was not tenacious in enforcing the rule that every participant was required to complete the entire activity process as a condition for aid disbursement. This was conveyed in the survivors' focus group discussion. "Person A participated in the training, Person B did not participate in the training, and they were monitored weekly." *But why is B still being distributed despite the fact that he has never participated in 1-3 training? Is he any good?*" As a result, there is eventually friction among the survivors. This condition, according to the Program Implementor, cannot be separated from the absorption of the budget that they must fulfill and the large number of survivors who are monitored with limited time and human resources.

CONCLUSIONS

The Livelihood Recovery Program in Disaster Areas can conclude several things, including: As evidenced by the fact that the majority of the businesses are still in operation, the program has been successful in providing a source of income for the survivors. Changing the type of business and expanding product lines are survivor strategies for staying in business. However, a lack of coordination with several government parties has resulted in the program's disintegration, which has an impact on future assistance. Furthermore, the duration of the program, the number of beneficiaries, and the Human Resources capacity of the program implementers all have an impact on the quality of assistance.



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